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A team of researchers, led by the Georgia Institute of Technology (GT) and including 
major collaborators from The Ohio State University (OSU), Texas A&M University 
College Station (TAMU), Texas A&M University Kingsville (TAMU-K), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL), and AREVA, as well as international partners at University 
of Zagreb, Politecnico di Milano, and Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics (SINAP) 
contribute to investigation of technology gaps and licensing challenges of Fluoride salt-
cooled High-temperature Reactor (FHR) under the current integrated research project 
(IRP). The most recent version of the Advanced High Temperature Reactor (AHTR), an 
FHR pre-conceptual design by ORNL, is selected as a candidate design for analysis 
and technology development.  
 
An FHR thermal hydraulics Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) panel 
was assembled and met at OSU on May 24-26, 2016, which was organized by OSU 
and ORNL. The primary objective of the thermal hydraulics PIRT exercise is to identify 
key phenomena that require further detailed study and impose challenges on thermal 
hydraulics codes/methodologies to support AHTR licensing. The thermal hydraulics 
PIRT exercise provides guidance and insights in designing separate-effect and integral-
effect tests for validation of thermal hydraulics codes. The thermal hydraulics PIRT 
panel consisted of fifteen experts specialized in salt reactor technologies, reactor 
thermal hydraulics, and code and methods development.  Eleven out of the fifteen 
panelists were voting members while all the panelists actively participated during this 
PIRT panel meeting.  Some student observers from GT, University of California-
Berkeley, and OSU also attended this thermal hydraulics PIRT exercise.  
 
This report discussed steps of developing a PIRT, FOM (Figures of Merit) and 
phenomena identification in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 reviewed AHTR thermal hydraulics 
design since the PIRTs were categorized based on regions of the reactor, including 
reactor core, vessel, cavity, primary loops, intermediate loops, and Direct Reactor 
Auxiliary Cooling System (DRACS). Two scenarios, i.e., station blackout and 
simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods, were discussed in detail during the 
workshop. The PIRT results and modeling path forward of these two events were 
reported in Chapters 4 and 5. For the two identified scenarios, the PIRTs consisted of 
phenomena, FOM of each phenomenon, importance level, knowledge level, and 
comments from the panelists. Chapter 6 summarized the phenomena which need 
further work and research for FHR analysis to support of reactor licensing and the 
verification and validation (V&V) of thermal hydraulics system-level analysis codes and 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation tools for FHRs.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Overview 
Fluoride-salt-cooled High-temperature Reactor (FHR) is one of the advanced reactor 
designs that combines improved technologies including low-pressure fluoride salt 
coolant, coated particle fuel (TRISO particles), Brayton power cycles, and passive 
safety systems. FHRs obtain several advantages including increased efficiency, low 
operation pressure, high core power density and high safety feature (Forsberg, 2005; 
Bardet et al., 2008). The Advanced High-Temperature Reactor (AHTR) is a FHR design 
concept proposed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). This report documents a 
thermal hydraulics Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) exercise for 
AHTR. The thermal hydraulics PIRT exercise was organized by The Ohio State 
University (OSU) and ORNL. 
 
The primary objective of the thermal hydraulics PIRT exercise panel was to identify key 
phenomena requiring further detailed study and requirements on thermal hydraulics 
codes/methodologies to support AHTR licensing. The PIRT process identifies and ranks 
safety relevant phenomena that impact the fidelity of thermal hydraulics analysis for 
AHTR, and determines needed new databases, modeling, and detailed analysis to 
validate simulation tools and methods. In addition, PIRT provides guidance and insights 
in designing separate-effect and integral-effect experimental programs for validation of 
thermal hydraulics codes. A two and a half day thermal hydraulics PIRT panel workshop 
was held at the OSU from May 24 to 26, 2016. The thermal hydraulics PIRT panel 
consisted of fifteen experts specialized in salt reactor technologies, reactor thermal 
hydraulics, code and method development.  Some student observers from GT, 
University of California-Berkeley, and OSU also attended this thermal hydraulics PIRT 
exercise.  
 
Table 1 shows a subset of the initial proposed scenarios and the figures of merit (FOM) 
to be discussed during the workshop. However, due to time constraint, only the first two 
scenarios, including station blackout and simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods 
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Table 1. A list of initially proposed scenarios and FOM for discussion 
 
Scenario FOM 
Station blackout Peak vessel temperature 
 Average temperature increase of 
carbonaceous materials in the core 
 Peak temperature of the DHX 
 Coolant temperature of the NDHX 
Simultaneous withdrawal of all control 
rods  
Hot leg temperature  
Maximum kernel temperature 
Flow blockage Peak fuel temperature 
 Percentage of flow decrease 
Loss of coolant accident (LOCA) Concrete temperature 
 Stainless steel temperature 
 
 
1.2. Report Organization 
A detailed discussion of the thermal hydraulics PIRT exercise process, including 
thermal hydraulics PIRT panelists, scenario description, etc., is given in Chapter 2. The 
thermal hydraulics PIRT during the meeting were categorized based on region of the 
reactor, including reactor core, vessel, cavity, primary loops, intermediate loops and 
Direct Reactor Auxiliary Cooling System (DRACS). Therefore, the AHTR thermal 
hydraulics design is reviewed in Chapter 3. Chapters 4 and 5 provide the information, 
such as phenomena identification and ranking, knowledge level ranking, the path 
forward, etc., for the events of station blackout and simultaneous withdrawal of all 
control rods, respectively. Chapter 6 summarizes the phenomena which need further 
work and research for FHR analysis to support of reactor licensing and the verification 
and validation (V&V) of thermal hydraulics system-level analysis codes and 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulation tools for FHRs.  
 
 
2. Overview of the PIRT Process  
2.1. Background 
The thermal hydraulics PIRT exercise is an expert elicitation process with the 
phenomena ranking tables as the final output.  The PIRT approach has been utilized in 
the nuclear industry for new reactor designs. The U.S. NRC developed the PIRT 
process for the next generation nuclear plant (Ball et al., 2008), which is beneficial for 
developing the AHTR thermal hydraulics PIRT.  
 
 
2.2. Thermal Hydraulics PIRT Panelist 
The thermal hydraulics PIRT panel consisted of fifteen experts specialized in salt 
reactor technologies, reactor thermal hydraulics, code developers and method 
developers. The panel members are listed in Table 2 and only the first twelve experts 
are voting members. In addition to panelists listed in Table 2, there were eleven 
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observers, including Pietro Avigni from Georgia Institute of Technology, Nicholas Brown 
from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, James Kendrick and Xin Wang from University of 
California Berkeley, Chong Zhou from Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics, and Hsun-
Chia Lin, Shanbin Shi, Xiao Wu, Junlian Yin, Sheng Zhang and Xiaoqin Zhang from The 
Ohio State University. David Diamond led the thermal hydraulics PIRT panel 
discussions and acted as the facilitator for the process. 
 
 
  Table 2. Thermal hydraulics PIRT exercise panelists and organization 
 
Name Organization 
David Diamond (Facilitator) Brookhaven National Laboratory 
Syd Ball Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Stephen Bajorek U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Kun Chen Shanghai Institute of Applied Physics 
Richard Christensen The Ohio State University 
Richard Denning The Ohio State University 
Yujun Guo Canada Nuclear Safety Commission 
Prashant Jain  Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Brian Mays AREVA 
W. David Pointer  Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Kevin Robb Oak Ridge National Laboratory 




Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
The Ohio State University 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
*: Non-voting members 
 
 
2.3. Thermal Hydraulics PIRT Exercise Process 
The panelists were first provided with the following three introductory presentations:  
 
• “The PIRT Process-Application to FHR Thermal Hydraulics” by David Diamond; 
• “Review of Advanced High-Temperature Reactor (AHTR) Thermal Hydraulic 
Design” by Hsun-Chia Lin;  
• “Summary of the White Paper prepared for FHR Thermal Hydraulics PIRT Panel” 
by Xiaodong Sun.  
 
Following the introduction, the panelists discussed AHTR design issues and finalized 
scenarios of interest in AHTR to be discussed by the panel. The panelists then identified 
and ranked phenomena in each scenario. PIRT panelists finally reviewed and 
commented on the established phenomena ranking tables. 
 
A detailed PIRT consists of the following nine steps (Ball et al., 2008):  
Step 1: Define the issue that is driving the need for a PIRT; 
Step 2: Define the specific objectives for the PIRT; 
Step 3: Define the hardware and the scenario for the PIRT; 
Step 4: Define the evaluation criterion; 
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Step 5: Identify, compile, and review the current knowledge base; 
Step 6: Identify plausible phenomena, that is, PIRT elements; 
Step 7: Develop importance ranking for phenomena; 
Step 8: Assess knowledge level for phenomena; and 
Step 9: Document PIRT results. 
 
2.3.1. Step 1: Define the Issue  
The objective of this step is to define the issue for AHTR future licensing applications. 
Issues related to AHTR safety should be identified. The definition may start with safety 
goals and descend to a consideration of important physical processes.  
 
2.3.2. Step 2: Define the Specific Objectives  
The objective of the thermal hydraulics PIRT exercise panel was to determine the 
important phenomena that impact the fidelity of thermal hydraulics analysis for the 
AHTR and determine where new databases, modeling, and detailed analysis need to be 
performed to validate computer codes and methods. In addition, it also provides 
guidance in establishing the requirements for separate-effects and integral-effects 
experimental programs in support of the AHTR licensing. 
 
2.3.3. Step 3: Define the Hardware and Scenario 
The AHTR design is the subject of this PIRT exercise. Four scenarios of the AHTR, 
including station blackout, simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods, reactor core flow 
blockage, and loss of coolant accident (LOCA) were proposed by the panelist. However, 
due to the limited time available (two and a half days), two scenarios, station blackout 
and simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods were selected for detailed discussion.  
 
2.3.4. Step 4: Define the Evaluation Criterion 
FOM defines the evaluation criterion. Since FOM depend on the scenario, each 
scenario has different FOM.  
 
For the event of station blackout, the four FOM identified were: 
 
• FOM1: Peak vessel temperature  
• FOM2: Coolant temperature of the natural draft heat exchanger (NDHX) 
• FOM3: Peak temperature of the DRACS heat exchanger (DHX) 
• FOM4: Average temperature increase of carbonaceous materials in the core 
 
For the event of station blackout, active cooling systems, such as the power conversion 
cycle loops, the maintenance cooling system, are out of commission. Although the 
DRACS are under operation, the three DRACS release only 0.75% of nominal thermal 
power. Therefore, vessel temperature may increase dramatically and affect its integrity. 
Thus, the peak vessel temperature was selected as a FOM for the event of station 
blackout. The coolant in the NDHX may freeze due to overcooling by the air and thus 
reduces DRACS cooling performance. Thus, the coolant temperature of the NDHX was 
selected as another FOM for the event of station blackout. Peak temperature of the 
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DHX is selected as a FOM for the event of station blackout because it affects DRACS 
cooling performance by influencing the integrity of the DHX. Average temperature 
increase of carbonaceous materials in the core is selected as a FOM for the event of 
station blackout because it characterizes stored energy in carbonaceous materials 
which may delay and reduce vessel temperature increase. Temperature increase in the 
carbonaceous materials will also lead to potential tritium release. Furthermore, the 
amount of tritium released also depends on the original amount of tritium retained in 
carbonaceous materials.  
 
For the event of simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods, the two FOM identified 
were: 
 
• FOM1: Hot leg temperature 
• FOM2: Maximum kernel temperature  
 
When all control rods are withdrawn at one time, a positive reactivity is introduced 
making the reactor supercritical. Although the primary pumps are operating, the coolant 
temperature may still increase significantly. The hot leg temperature is the maximum 
temperature of the entire primary loop; it may exceed the structural material melting 
temperature and thus affects primary loop integrity. As for maximum kernel temperature, 
it was selected because of its significant influence on kernel integrity. 
 
For reactor core flow blockage, two FOM identified were: 
 
• FOM1: Percentage of flow decrease  
• FOM2: Peak fuel temperature 
 
Under reactor core flow blockage condition, temperature increase of blocked 
assemblies depends on the percentage of flow decrease. Therefore, the percentage of 
flow decrease was selected as a FOM for reactor core flow blockage. For the second 
FOM, the peak fuel temperature has a large effect on fuel integrity.  
 
For LOCA, two FOM identified were: 
 
• FOM1: Concrete temperature 
• FOM2: Stainless steel temperature 
 
Concrete temperature was selected as a FOM for LOCA because it affects concrete 
integrity. Stainless steel temperature was selected as a FOM because that its 
temperature affects integrity of structure material such as guard vessel. 
 
2.3.5. Step 5: Identify, Compile, and Review the Current Knowledge Base  
PIRT Panel members reviewed the thermal hydraulics whitepaper and relevant 
references. In addition, presentations at the meeting were beneficial for panelists to 
develop an understanding of current knowledge base related with AHTR technologies.  
 
2.3.6. Step 6: Identify Plausible Phenomena 
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Systems and components in AHTR were defined and classified by panelists as follows,  
 
• Core: fuel, primary coolant  
• Vessel/internals/cavity: upper plenum, lower plenum, fluidic diode, reactor 
vessel, cavity 
• Primary loop: pump, piping, primary to intermediate heat exchanger (P-IHX) 
• Intermediate loop: pump, piping, P-IHX, intermediate to power loop heat 
exchanger (I-PHX)  
• Power conversion loop: I-PHX 
• DRACS: piping, DHX, NDHX, DRACS salt, chimney 
 
Phenomena for each scenario was identified, defined, and documented in Chapter 4 
and 5.  
 
2.3.7. Step 7: Develop Importance Ranking  
After the phenomena had been identified, phenomena importance ranking level was 
decided by panelists based on its effects on the FOMs. Table 3 shows the phenomena 
importance ranking and rationale. Under consideration of its importance to each FOM in 
a specific scenario, panelists then voted for each phenomenon, and phenomena 
importance ranking is then solidified by averaging the votes.  
 
Voting members classified each phenomenon as having a large effect (High), moderate 
effect (Medium), or small effect (Low) on one FOM in a specific scenario. Votes for High 
(H), Medium (M), and Low (L) importance were assigned numerical scores of 8, 5, and 
2, respectively. If the average was larger than 6.5, the importance was assigned as 
High. If the average was between 3.5 and 6.5, the importance was assigned as Medium. 
If the average was below 3.5, the importance was set to Low.  
 
 
Table 3. Phenomena importance ranking and rationale (Ball et al., 2008) 
 
Ranking Description 
High (H) Significant or dominant influence on FOM 
Medium (M) Moderate influence on FOM 
Low (L) Small influence on FOM (including the 
possibility that the phenomena is not 
present or possible) 
 
 
2.3.8. Step 8: Assess Knowledge Level 
Similar to Step 7, panelists voted for the knowledge level of each phenomenon. In this 
step, knowledge level was classified as known (K), partially known (P), and unknown 
(U). Table 4 shows knowledge level ranking and rationale. If more than 75% of voting 
members ranked one phenomenon as known, it was set to known. If less than 25% of 
voting members ranked one phenomenon as unknown, it was set to unknown. 
Otherwise, it was set to partially known.    
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Phenomenon is well understood and can 
be accurately modeled 
Partially Known (P) 
Phenomenon is understood, however, 
can only be modeled with moderate 
uncertainty 
Unknown (U) 
Phenomenon is not well understood. 
Modeling is current either not possible or 
is possible only with large uncertainty 
 
 
After phenomena importance ranking and knowledge level ranking, we then moved to 
determine the phenomena that need further consideration. Table 5 shows the 
phenomena determination rules for further consideration. As can be seen from the table, 
phenomena under three combinations of importance ranking and knowledge level 
require further consideration: 1) the importance ranking is high (H) and knowledge level 
is partially known (P), 2) the importance ranking is high (H) and knowledge level is 




Table 5. Determination of phenomena for further consideration 
 
  Importance 
Ranking (IR) 
  H  M  L  
K     
P  YES   
U  YES YES  
 
 
2.3.9. Step 9: Document PIRT Results  
PIRT results, including phenomena definition, importance ranking, knowledge level 
ranking, rationale for all rankings, next steps for phenomena that need further 
consideration and prioritization of next steps should be documented in this step.  
 
 
3. Introduction of AHTR 
In parallel to the effort have organized by Georgia Tech in developing a neutronics PIRT, 
researchers at OSU and ORNL are organizing a thermal hydraulics PIRT exercises for 
the AHTR. To be consistent, the AHTR conceptual design developed by ORNL was 
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selected as the reference design for the present thermal hydraulics PIRT study. In the 
subsequent sections, a general overview of the ORNL AHTR conceptual design will be 
presented, focusing on the thermal hydraulics related design including core, reactor 
vessel, reactor coolant systems and reactor safety system in the AHTR. The information 
presented hereafter is mainly based on the partially optimized AHTR design report by 
Varma et al. (2012), supplemented by an earlier AHTR design report by Holcomb et al. 
(2011).  
 
3.1. General Overview of the AHTR Plant Design 
The AHTR is an FHR design concept with a thermal power output of 3400 MW. The 
AHTR consists of three primary loops and three intermediate loops that are coupled to a 
supercritical water power cycle. The molten salt FLiBe (2LiF-BeF2), which was 
extensively investigated in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) project, is 
adopted as the AHTR primary coolant, while a mixture of KF and ZrF4 featuring a low 
melting point is used as the intermediate coolant. The AHTR relies on three DRACS 
loops for passive decay heat removal. The DRACS also employs KF-ZrF4 as the 
coolant in the DRACS secondary circuit that is coupled to the ultimate heat sink, the 
ambient air.  
 
The main heat transfer paths for the AHTR are illustrated in Figure 1. The reactor core 
is divided into the central core region and the outer annular downcomer region through 
the barrel structure. During the normal operation, the forced flow provided by the pump 
first enters the reactor vessel, flowing downward in the downcomer, turning around at 
the lower plenum, flowing upward and being heated up in the core region, and then 
flowing toward the P-IHX. The primary coolant exchanges heat with the intermediate 
coolant in the P-IHX, while the latter eventually transfers heat to the supercritical water 
power cycle. In parallel to the main forced flow through the core during normal operation, 
there is also a small forced flow passing the DHX, transferring heat to the DRACS 
coolant and maintaining it in the liquid state. A fluidic diode is employed to limit this 
parasitic secondary flow (in the reverse flow direction of the fluid diode) and, accordingly, 
the parasitic heat loss into the DRACS during reactor normal operation. Upon the loss 
of the forced flow and reactor shutdown, a natural circulation flow will develop in the 
forward flow direction of the fluidic diode featuring low flow resistance in the primary salt 
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Figure 1. AHTR heat transfer paths (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
 
The general AHTR plant design parameters are summarized in Table 6. The average 
core outlet temperature is limited to 700 oC, mainly due to the limits imposed by the 
ASME code for the structural materials. Due to the high melting point and low vapor 
pressure of the adopted fluoride salt coolants, the entire AHTR except the power cycle 
is operated at the atmospheric pressure. The AHTR utilizes the TRISO particle 
embedded in graphite plates with a fuel enrichment of 9.00 wt% (vs 19.75 wt% in the 
first report by Holcomb et al., (2011)). Details on the core and heat transfer loop designs 
will be provided in the following sections. They can also be found in the two reference 
reports (Holcomb et al., 2011; Varma et al., 2012). 
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Table 6. AHTR general design parameters (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
Parameter Value Unit 
Core Thermal Power 3,400 MW 
Net Electrical Power 1,530 MW 
Fuel Type TRISO - 
Fuel Enrichment 9.00 wt% 
Primary Coolant Salt 2LiF-BeF2 - 
Core Outlet Temperature 700 oC 
Core Inlet Temperature 650 oC 
Primary Coolant Flow Rate 28,500 kg/s 
Primary Coolant Pressure Atmospheric - 
Number of Primary Loops 3 - 
Intermediate Coolant Salt 53%KF-47%ZrF4 - 
Intermediate Loop Hot Leg Temperature 675 oC 
Intermediate Loop Cold Leg Temperature 600 oC 
Intermediate Coolant Flow Rate 43,200 kg/s 
Intermediate Coolant Pressure Atmospheric - 
Number of Intermediate Loops 3 - 
Fluid to High Pressure Turbine Supercritical 
Steam 
- 
Turbine Supply Temperature 650 oC 
Turbine Supply Pressure 24 MPa 
DRACS Loop Coolant 53%KF-47%ZrF4 - 
DRACS Loop Pressure Atmospheric - 
DRACS Heat Sink Air - 
Number of DRACS Loops 3 - 
Single DRACS Loop Maximum Power  8.75 MW 
 
 
3.2. AHTR Neutronics Design 
The AHTR neutronics preconceptual design was first developed by Holcomb et al. 
(2011), and subsequently refined by Varma et al. (2012). In the new design, the AHTR 
fuel enrichment has been lowered to 9.00 wt% from the old design value of 19.75 wt% 
and the carbon-to-heavy metal (CHM) atomic ratio has been raised from 200 to 400 to 
minimize the fuel cost, as well as the enrichment cost. In addition, a higher density 
carbonaceous matrix material (1.75 kg/m3) has been employed in the new design to 
achieve higher discharge burnup. The main neutronics design characteristics of the 
refined AHTR baseline model are summarized in Table 7. Further details of the 
neutronics design of the referenced AHTR, including the core power distribution, 
burnable poison, etc., can be found in the two ORNL reports (Holcomb et al., 2011; 
Varma et al., 2012). 
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Table 7. Main refined AHTR neutronics design characteristics (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
Parameter Value Unit 
Core Thermal Power 3,400 MW 
Assembly Lattice Type Hexagonal - 
Fuel Type TRISO - 
Moderator Graphite - 
Reflector Graphite - 
Core Height (including axial reflector) 6.0 m 
Core Diameter (including radial reflector) 9.56 m 
Average Power per Grain 77 MW/particle 
Average Power Density in Fueled Region 97 W/cm3 
Volumetric Core Power Density 12.9 MW/m3 
Mass of Heavy Metal (fresh core) 17.48 MT 
Fuel Enrichment 9.00 wt% 
Mass of Fissile 1.6 MT 
Fuel Cycle Length (once-through, no BP) 0.80 years 
Fuel Cycle Length (once-through, with BP) 0.72 years 
Fuel Residence Time in Core (two batch) 1.0 years 
Average Fuel Discharge Burnup 71 GWd/MT-
heavy metal 
Maximum Fuel Temperature (average assembly) 837 oC 
 
 
3.3. AHTR Thermal Hydraulics Design 
In this section, the design specifications and parameters of the AHTR components that 
are related to the thermal hydraulics PIRT exercises are reviewed.  
 
3.3.1. Reactor Vessel 
The AHTR reactor vessel design parameters are listed in Table 8. The reactor vessel is 
approximately in a cylindrical shape and hung from its upper flange to minimize the 
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Table 8. AHTR reactor vessel design parameters (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
Parameter Value Unit 
Exterior Vessel Diameter 10.5 m 
Vessel Height 19.1 m 
Primary Salt Depth Above Upper Support Plate 7.15 m 
Primary Piping Interior Diameter 1.24 m 
Primary Salt Mass 3,076 MT 
Number of DRACS Loops 3 - 
Core Barrel Material C-C Composite - 
Vessel and Primary Piping Material Incoloy 800H 
w/Hastelloy N Lining 
- 
Number of Fuel Assemblies 252 - 





Figure 2. Sectional view of the AHTR reactor vessel (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
 
The reactor vessel is made from Incoloy 800H, which features a high allowable yield 
strength of 20 MPa at 700oC. Due to the potential corrosion attack by the FLiBe coolant, 
a thin liner (1 cm thick) of Hastelloy N is applied to the interior of the Incoloy 800H 
vessel. The vessel thickness is not provided in the ORNL reports; however, it should not 
be difficult to make an estimate based on the ASME code requirements. The top flange, 
as shown in Figure 3, is in a disk shape with a diameter of 11.6 m and a thickness of 35 
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cm. The flange consists of a truss structure fabricated by two 1.5-cm thick stainless-





Figure 3. Top flange of the AHTR reactor vessel (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
 
3.3.2. Reactor Core 
The reactor core consists of 252 fuel assemblies supported by the upper and lower 
support plates, as shown in Figure 4. The core design features a moderator block in the 
center and a row of hexagonal replaceable reflector assemblies surrounding the fuel 
assemblies. The central moderator block and the replaceable reflector assemblies are 
made of graphite and have the same size and shape as the fuel assemblies. Outside of 
the reflector assemblies are a permanent graphite reflector and a 2-cm thick carbon-
carbon (C-C) composite core barrel. The interior surface of the barrel facing the core 
has a 1-cm thick boron carbide plating to reduce the neutron radiation to the reactor 
vessel. The annulus formed between the barrel and reactor vessel is vertically divided 
into eight compartments, including three downcomer regions, three DRACS heat 
exchanger regions, one maintenance cooling system, and one refueling lobe, as shown 
in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Cross-sectional view of the reactor vessel (Varma et al., 2012) 
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The lower core support plate provides support to the reactor core. This plate has a 
honeycomb structure made from 35-cm thick SiC-SiC composite pieces. Channels are 
fabricated in the lower support plate to direct the flow into the fuel assemblies, as shown 
in Figure 6. In addition, indexing holes and guides are fabricated to assist with the 
alignment of the fuel assemblies, which have a gap distance of 1.75 cm with the 
neighboring fuel assemblies. The main function of the upper core support plate is to 
align and hold the fuel assemblies in place against the upward flowing salt during 
reactor operation. The upper support plate is made from the same material and has the 
same thickness as the lower support plate. The geometric parameters of the AHTR 





Figure 6. AHTR lower support plate (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
 
Table 9. Geometric parameters of the AHTR reactor core (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
Parameter Value Unit 
Equivalent Core OD (fueled region) 7.81 m 
Equivalent Replaceable Reflector OD 8.69 m 
Equivalent Permanent Reflector OD 9.56 m 
Boron Carbide Layer OD 9.58 m 
Barrel OD 9.62 m 
Core Height (fueled region) 5.5 m 
Core Height (including axial reflector) 6.0 m 
Vessel OD 10.50 m 
 
 
3.3.3. Fuel Assembly 
The fuel assembly consists of eighteen fuel plates enclosed in a 6-m long hexagonal 
prismatic box with 1-cm thick C-C composite walls. The fuel plates, with a thickness of 
2.55 cm, are divided into three groups that are separated by a 4-cm thick Y-shaped C-C 
composite structure, as shown in Figure 7. The 0.7-cm thick gap between two interior 
fuel plates allows the primary salt flow. For the two fuel plates adjacent to the channel 
 
 16 Thermal-hydraulics PIRT Report 
box wall and Y-structure wall, the flow channel is 0.35 cm thick. The gap between two 
neighboring fuel assemblies is 1.75 cm thick, resulting in a fuel assembly pitch of 46.75 





Figure 7. Cross section of the fuel assembly, Unit: cm (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
 
Table 10. Geometric parameters of the AHTR fuel assembly (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
Parameter Value Unit 
Total Height 6.0 m 
Fueled Region Height 5.5 m 
Fuel Assembly Pitch 46.75 cm 
Outer Apothem 22.5 cm 
Channel Box Wall Thickness 1 cm 
Y-structure Thickness 4 cm 
Coolant Thickness between Plates 0.7 cm 
Coolant Thickness between Plate and Wall 0.35 cm 
Fuel Plate Thickness 2.55 cm 
Number of Fuel Plates 18 - 
 
 
3.4. Reactor Coolant Systems 
The AHTR reactor cooling is achieved through the three primary loops (that are coupled 
with the three intermediate loops) during reactor normal operation, while the three 
DRACS loops are responsible for the decay heat removal during accidents. In the two 
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ORNL reference reports, detailed designs of the cooling systems are not provided. In 
the study of thermal hydraulics analysis of the AHTR by Wang et al., (2015), some 
preliminary design parameters of the AHTR cooling systems are available and thus 
adopted in this white paper as a reference.  
 
3.4.1 Primary Loop and Intermediate Loop 
During reactor normal operation, primary heat removal is achieved through three 
primary coolant loops, consisting of the primary piping, the P-IHX, and the primary salt 
pump. The three primary loops are coupled with three intermediate loops through the P-
IHX’s, as shown in Figure 8. The piping in both loops has an inner diameter of 1.24 m 
and are made from Hastelloy N (Varma et al., 2012). The hot leg length and cold leg 





Figure 8. AHTR primary and intermediate cooling loops (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
 
A shell-and-tube type heat exchanger is adopted for the P-IHX. Wang et al. (2015) 
assumed a simple design with one pass for both the shell and tube sides. The design 
parameters and coolant thermal properties assumed by Wang et al. are summarized in 
Table 11. A few P-IHX designs with different fluid allocation on the shell and tube sides 
were developed by Wang et al. and the final design adopted is summarized in Table 12.  
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Coolant Salt 2LiF-BeF2 53%KF-47%ZrF4 
HX Inlet Temperature (K) 973 873 
HX Outlet Temperature (K) 923 948 
Coolant Flow Rate (kg/s) 9,500 14,400 
Coolant Density (kg/m3) 1,950 2,850 
Coolant Viscosity (kg/m-s) 0.00609 0.00522 
Coolant Conductivity (W/m-K) 1.1 0.42 
Coolant Specific Heat Capacity (J/kg-K) 2,416 1,051 
Coolant Prandtl Number 13.32 12.95 
 
 
Table 12. P-IHX design (Wang et al., 2015) 
 
Parameter Shell Side Tube Side 
Loop Allocation Primary Intermediate 
Coolant Salt 2LiF-BeF2 53%KF-47%ZrF4 
Tube Length (m) - 20.0 
Tube ID (cm) - 1.9735 
Tube Wall Thickness (cm) - 0.1245 
Number of Tubes - 18,000 
Tube Pitch (cm) - 1.5 OD 
Tube Arrangement - Square array 
Shell Inside Diameter (m) 5.18 - 
Baffle Spacing (m) 2.0 - 
Baffle Cut 25% - 
 
 
3.5. Reactor Safety Systems 
3.5.1. DRACS Cooling System  
Decay heat removal in the AHTR is provided by three DRACS loops, each capable of 
removing 0.25% of the nominal core power, i.e., 8.5 MWth. A schematic of the DRACS 
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Figure 9. Schematic of the DRACS (Varma et al., 2012) 
 
 
The DRACS loops are coupled with the AHTR primary salt system through the DHX’s 
that are submerged in the reactor pool. The preliminary design parameters of the DHX 
by Wang et al., (2015) are summarized in Table 13. The DHX is connected to the NDHX 
through piping with an inner diameter of 0.4 m (Wang et al., 2015). The NDHX is at a 
higher elevation than the DHX by a minimum of 16 m (Varma et al., 2012). The lengths 
of the cold leg and hot leg of the DRACS loop are both 35 m. The DRACS cooling tower 
of an annular design houses the NDHX and has a height of 12.92 m, inner radius of 2.5 
m and outer radius of 3 m (Wang et al., 2015). The preliminary design parameters of the 
NDHX are summarized in Table 14.   
 
 
Table 13. Preliminary design parameters of DHX (Wang et al., 2015) 
 
DHX Design Shell and Tube 
Tube Arrangement Staggered 
Primary Side Shell 
DRACS Side Tube 
Number of Tubes 1,078 
Number of Tube Rows 98 
Number of Tube Passes 3 
Tube Length (m) 3.6 
Tube OD (cm) 2.54 
Tube Wall Thickness (cm) 0.1651 
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Table 14. Preliminary design parameters of NDHX (Wang et al., 2015) 
 
NDHX Design Horizontal Fined 
Tubes 
Tube Arrangement Inline 
DRACS Loop Side Tube 
Number of Tubes 200 
Number of Tube Rows 4 
Number of Tube Passes 1 
Tube Length (m) 4.0 
Tube OD (cm) 2.54 
Tube Wall Thickness (cm) 0.1651 
Fin Height (cm) 2.54 
Fin Spacing (cm) 1.5  
 
 
3.5.2. Maintenance Cooling System 
In addition to the DRACS cooling system, the maintenance cooling system also 
participates in heat removal from the reactor when the reactor and the primary cooling 
system are shut down for planned maintenance, as shown in Figure 9. The 
maintenance heat exchanger that is submerged in the reactor pool is the same as the 
DHX, but the salt flow through the maintenance heat exchanger is circulated by a pump. 
Also, in the salt-to-air heat exchanger, forced air circulation flow instead of natural 
convection flow is provided from a fan. Due to these differences, the heat removal 
capability of the maintenance cooling system is significantly larger than that of the 
DRACS system, namely, 5% of the nominal core power or 170 MWth.  
 
3.5.3. Reactor Cavity Cooling System 
The reactor guard vessel is surrounded by a concrete silo that fits closely around the 
reactor vessel so that, even if there was a failure in the reactor vessel, the salt level 
would still cover the core. Long-term passive safety calls for cooling of the reactor silo 
structure, limiting the temperature of the containment concrete. In normal operation, 
reflective insulation and a partially evacuated, argon-filled barrier are maintained 
between the reactor vessel and the concrete silo walls. Cold argon, supplied from the 
liquid argon evaporator system, will be used to help keep the silo concrete temperature 
down. A Stirling engine coupled to a blower will be used to assist with the flow. The 
required capability of the reactor cavity cooling system is affected by the design of the 
DRACS and the reflective insulation. The reflective insulation could reduce the heat loss 
from the silo to below 5 MWth (vs. 15 MWth without the insulation) during reactor 
normal operation. However, the use of the reflective insulation will also limit the heat 
removal during accident scenarios, thus resulting in higher temperature excursions with 
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4. PIRT for the Event of Station Blackout  
This section introduces the event of station blackout, including the event definition, the 
proposed FOM and reasons for selecting these FOM, and the current status of 
modeling of the event. Based on the significance of the identified phenomena and 
current research and knowledge status, path forward to better model the event is 
proposed. The final PIRT results for this event are listed in Section 4.4.  
 
4.1. Definition of the Event 
A station blackout event is the total loss of all offsite and onsite alternating current (AC) 
power. Per design, when the external AC electrical power is lost, onsite emergency 
diesel generators will start working to provide AC electrical power for safe operations 
and accident recovery. However, when the diesel generators also fail, the nuclear 
power plant is then left in the station blackout event.  
 
In the event of station blackout, the pumps will trip and coast down due to no electric 
power supply. Therefore, forced coolant circulations is gradually lost. As an emergence 
response, the reactor will scram. One major concern in such situations is the generation 
and removal of decay heat. Safety analysis shows that station blackout is a significant 
contributor to overall plant risk. For the AHTR design, the fuel and coolants have large 
thermal margins in normal operations before failure. However, even with the superior 
inherent safety features, station blackout is still an event worthwhile investigating into for 
the AHTR design.  
 
4.2. Proposed FOM of the Event 
The PIRT panel identified and ranked phenomena based on the following FOM: 
 
1. Peak vessel temperature: 
Under a station blackout, active cooling systems of the AHTR, such as the power 
conversion cycle loops and maintenance cooling system, are not available for 
heat removal from the reactor. After a reactor trip, DRACS cooling system can be 
launched and three DRACS loops takes out about 0.75% of nominal thermal 
power based on the AHTR design. Therefore, vessel temperature may increase 
dramatically and exceed its damage point if the heat removal rate keeps being 
less than the heat generation rate. That is the reason why peak vessel 
temperature is selected as an FOM for the event of station blackout. 
 
2. Average temperature increase of carbonaceous materials in the core: 
This FOM is selected because it characterizes the stored energy in 
carbonaceous materials, which may significantly delay and reduce the increase 
of vessel temperature. Temperature increase in carbonaceous materials will also 
lead to potential tritium release. However, the amount of tritium released also 
depends on the original amount of tritium retained in these carbonaceous 
materials.  
 
3. DRACS salt temperature of the NDHX: 
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Coolant in the NDHX may freeze due to the overcooling by the air in the natural 
draft chimney and thus reduces DRACS cooling performance. Therefore, this 
FOM is selected.  
 
4. Peak temperature of the DHX: 
Peak temperature of the DHX is selected as an FOM for the event of station 
blackout because it affects DRACS cooling performance due to the potential 
damage to the integrity of the DHX.  
 
4.3. Modeling the Event and Path Forward 
To better understand the phenomena in the station blackout event, analysis using 
system-level codes and CFD codes are necessary, more studies and research are still 
needed for reactor safety analysis. Large-scale CFD models of the reactor core with 
downcomer will help the understanding of the core flow asymmetry phenomenon. CFD 
analysis is better positioned to investigate structure material swelling and distortion 
effects on the flow channels in the reactor core. For the reactor vessel, upper plenum 
mixing is to be modeled using CFD. In both the primary loop and the intermediate loop, 
although some simplified models have already been studied for pump performance, 
further investigation on the design and testing of pumps for salt applications should be 
carried out. It is the same situation with the P-IHX and I-PHX. The system-level analysis 
of this event should also be performed to investigate decay heat removal capability, 
peak temperature in structure and coolant salt, natural circulation performance, etc. 
based the reactor design. 
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4.4. PIRT for Station Blackout 
Table 15. Station blackout PIRT chart - Core/Fuel 
 
System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomeno
n Definition 
Figures of Merit (FOM) 
and Importance Level 
Knowledge 




material   
 
Heat capacity 
















1. After the reactor scrams, a portion of the 
captured tritium in carbonaceous materials 
will release to the salt with temperature 
increase. Tritium release rate depends on: 
a. Initial amount of captured tritium in 
carbonaceous materials 
b. Temperature difference before and after 
the reactor scram 
2. Tritium retention in carbonaceous materials 
mainly depends on the temperature: 
a. higher temperature results in lower 
tritium retention 
b. Since temperature of the reflector is 
lower than that of the fuel, more tritium 
might be retained in the reflector than in 
the fuel carbonaceous materials 
3. Tritium retention capability among different 
types of the carbonaceous differs greatly 
4. Heat capacity of the carbonaceous 
materials of different grades is well known  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
does not require further exploration  
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System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomeno
n Definition 
Figures of Merit (FOM) 
and Importance Level 
Knowledge 












temperature: M P 
Comments:  
Part of the TRISO particles are made of the 
carbonaceous materials  
 
Path forward: 
Consult material scientists  
Heat capacity 
of the fuel 
stripe 









increase of the 
carbonaceous materials 
in the core: H 
K 
Comments: 
The fuel stripe here is included as a part of 
the carbonaceous materials  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
does not require further exploration 
Thermal 
conductivity 
of the fuel 
stripe 






temperature: M P 
Comments: 
Analysis for this phenomenon is similar to 
that for the thermal conductivity of the 
carbonaceous materials  
 
Path forward: 
Consult material scientists  
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System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomeno
n Definition 
Figures of Merit (FOM) 
and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Heat capacity 
of the fuel 
kernel 






temperature: L - 
Comments: 
To study its effect on the vessel 
temperature, the mass and heat capacity of 
the fuel kernel need to be considered. 
Therefore, overall heat capacity is defined 
as pmc   
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
does not require further exploration   
Thermal 
conductivity 
of the fuel 
kernel 






temperature: L - 
Comments: 
The mass of the fuel kernel is small  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
does not require further exploration 
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System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomeno
n Definition 
Figures of Merit (FOM) 
and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Geometry of 






temperature: M U 
Comments: 
1. Affects the size of the flow channels, 
pressure drop and heat transfer 
2. Highly related to mixing of flow in the 
plenums and therefore flow distribution 
3. Generally, graphite first swells and then 
shrinks under irradiation 
4. Lack of knowledge. Panel not equipped to 
address this phenomenon 
 
Path forward: 
Consult material scientists. It is an issue 
less related to thermal hydraulics  
Energy 
generation 























None. Based on the combined   importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
does not require further exploration 
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System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomeno
n Definition 
Figures of Merit (FOM) 
and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Radiative 
heat transfer  
 
Surface of 
the fuel plate 
Peak vessel 




Path forward:  
None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 








temperature: M P 
Comments: 
1. Fuel kernels burn out fast. Fuel elements 
should be replaced before serious 
deformation happens  
2. Carbon surface obeys Young’s modulus 
3. Corrosion could happen to carbon 
 
Path forward: 
Needs further investigation in material and 
fuel aspects 
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Table 16. Station blackout PIRT chart - Core/Primary coolant flow  
 
System/ID: 1 Core (b) Primary Coolant Flow 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Heat capacity of 
FLiBe 
As a function 
of the 
temperature  






None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 

















Review current uncertainties in 
measurements; understand sensitivities 
to those uncertainties 
Viscosity of 
FLiBe 
As a function 
of the 
temperature  









Review current uncertainties in the 
measurements; understand sensitivities 
to those uncertainties 
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System/ID: 1 Core (b) Primary Coolant Flow 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 











increase of the 
carbonaceous materials 






Separate-effect tests for correlation 











Peak vessel temperature: 
L - 
Comments: 
1. Radiation heat transfer is much 
lower than convective heat transfer 
2. FLiBe is transparent 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 





and exit loss 
coefficients 
as a function 




Peak vessel temperature: 
M P 
Comments: 
Small change in the design could 
potentially lead to large difference  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 1 Core (b) Primary Coolant Flow 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 





ridges on the 
fuel plates  
Average temperature 
increase of the 
carbonaceous materials 
in the core: H 
P 
Comments: 
1. Similar to the surface condition 
2. Affects local flow condition 
(laminar or turbulent) 
 
Path forward: 





in the vessel  
Peak vessel temperature: 
M U 
Comments: 
1. Typical situations of the 
asymmetry: 
a. At least one DRACS is not 
working properly: either has 
flow through but no heat 
rejection, or no flow and the 
flow distribution in the core is 
changed; 
b. One part of the vessel has 
higher temperature than the 
other parts. During normal 
operation, power generation is 
homogeneous  
2. Needs calculation of the coolant 
mixing in the downcomer 
 
Path forward: 
1. Perform CFD calculations of the 
core, downcomer, lower plenum 
and upper plenum 
2. Conduct scaled integral-effect 
tests 
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System/ID: 1 Core (b) Primary Coolant Flow 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 





Peak vessel temperature: 
L - 
Comments: 




1. Design needs to be solidified  
2. Perform CFD analysis to 







from fuel as 
a function of 
the axial and 
radial 
position in 









increase of the 
carbonaceous materials 
in the core: M 
P 
Comments: 
Gamma spectrum is one of the direct 
energy deposition sources 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
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Table 17. Station blackout PIRT chart - Vessel 
 
System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 









Peak vessel temperature: 
H U 
Comments: 
1. Needs modeling for: 
a. Mixing and cross flow in this 
region 
b. Heat transfer to upper plenum 
structural materials 




1. Perform CFD calculations of the 
lower plenum, upper plenum and 
downcomer 
2. Perform scaled experiments for 
validation 
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System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Fluidic diodicity 
Pressure 
loss as a 
function of 
flow direction 
and flow rate  
Peak vessel temperature: 
H P 
 Comments: 
1. Affects core bypass flow, 
circulation mass flow rate, DRACS 
performance, etc.  
2. No reverse flow on the coolant 
side of DRACS, but reverse flow 
could happen on the primary side  
3. Simulation and experimental 
results obtained from Low-
Temperature DRACS test Facility, 
LTDF provide a reference 
 
Path forward: 
Continue investigation and research of 













None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Thermal heat 






vessel wall  
Peak vessel temperature: 
L - 
Comments: 
The thin vessel wall leads to small 
thermal inertia  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 









vessel wall  






None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 














None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Heat transfer 









Peak vessel temperature: 
M K 
Comments: 
Simple geometry and well known  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
Friction factor on 











None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 





Peak vessel temperature: 
M U 
Comments: 
1. Similar to the situation in the upper 
plenum 
2. The height of the lower plenum is 




Perform CFD calculations of the lower 
plenum and downcomer 
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System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Heat transfer to 
the cover gas 






Peak vessel temperature: 
M P 
Comments: 
1. The top flange has a large surface 
area 
2. Core will be submerged in the salt 
while the decay heat keeps the salt 
molten. Therefore, the temperature 




None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
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Table 18. Station blackout PIRT chart - Cavity 
 
System/ID: 2(b). Cavity 
Phenomenon Definition Figure of Merits (FOMs) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Thermal 





and capacity  
Peak vessel temperature: 
L - 
Comments: 
1. Argon gap between vessel and 
insulation 
2. Certain degree of thermal 
expansion of the insulation has to 
be taken into consideration 
3. Design has to be improved for 
easier attachment of the insulation 
to the guard vessel  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, 
this phenomenon does not require 
further exploration 
Heat transfer 
across vessel to 










None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, 
this phenomenon does not require 
further exploration 
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System/ID: 2(b). Cavity 
Phenomenon Definition Figure of Merits (FOMs) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Heat transfer 
across second 




Peak vessel temperature: 
L - 
Comments: 
Reasons for the existence of argon 
gap: 
a. To accommodate thermal 
expansion of the insulation, 
which is inside the guard vessel  
b. To allow robots with mirror to 
get into the gap for vessel 
inspection. This is also the 
design base for the thickness of 
the argon gap 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, 













None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, 
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Table 19. Station blackout PIRT chart - Primary loop 
 
System/ID: 3 Primary Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 















Peak vessel temperature: 
L - 
Comments: 
Pump working condition is included in the 
initial conditions in modeling for all events 
 
Path forward: 
1. Conduct investigation on design 
and testing of pumps 
2. Set pump requirements and share 
with vendors 
3. Perform analysis that informs 
pump design inputs/parameters 
4. Simple models are currently 
available 
Pump resistance 




Peak vessel temperature: 
L - 
Comments:  
The pump functions as additional flow 
resistance when not working 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 3 Primary Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Form loss in the 
loop 
Pressure 










None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 











None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 






drop on the 
primary side 






None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
 
 41                                                           Thermal-hydraulics PIRT Report 
System/ID: 3 Primary Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 















None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
Impact of the 
cover gas 
entrainment on 











None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
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Table 20. Station blackout PIRT chart - Intermediate loop 
 
System/ID: 4. Intermediate Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 









(vendor info)  






1. Conduct investigation on design 
and testing of pumps 
2. Set pump requirements and share 
with pump vendors 
3. Perform analysis that informs 
pump design inputs/parameters 
4. Simple models are currently 
available 
Pump coastdown Speed versus time 






None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
Pump resistance 










None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 4. Intermediate Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Form loss in the 
loop 
Pressure 










None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 











None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 















1. Conduct investigation on design 
and testing of P-IHX 
2. Perform analysis that informs P-
IHX design inputs/parameters 
3. Simple models are currently 
available 
 
 44                                                           Thermal-hydraulics PIRT Report 
System/ID: 4. Intermediate Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 











None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 






drop in the 
intermediate 
loop 






1. Conduct investigation on the 
design and testing of P-IHX 
2. Perform analysis that informs P-
IHX design inputs/parameters 
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Table 21. Station blackout PIRT chart - Power cycle 
 
System/ID: 5. Power Cycle 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 





drop on the 
power cycle 
side 






1. Perform analysis that informs I-
PHX design inputs/parameters 
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Table 22. Station blackout PIRT chart – DRACS 
 
System/ID: 6. DRACS 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
DRACS piping Friction and form losses  






None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 






drop on both 
sides  
Peak vessel temperature: 
H P 
Comments: 
Needs to pay attention to DHX peak 
temperature and potential damage to the 
heat exchanger structure  
 
Path forward: 
1. Perform scaled integral-effect tests 
2. Keep investigation and research 





drop on both 
sides  
Peak vessel temperature: 
H P 
Comments: 
1. Potential tritium leakage since the 
cooling medium is air 
2. Tritium release rate depends on: 
a. Initial amount of tritium trapped 
in the carbonaceous materials; 
b. Temperature difference before 
and after reactor scram  
 
Path forward: 
Perform scaled integral-effect tests 
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System/ID: 6. DRACS 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 





Peak vessel temperature: 
H P 
Comments: 
1. Piping is designed as insulated 
pipe and structure: 
a. Total heat loss is also affected 
by other piping systems  
b. Needs experimental data 













Peak vessel temperature: 
H P 
Comments: 
1. The design should leave sufficient 
margins for all conditions  
2. Design needed for the louvers. 
The most current design includes 
flaps to prevent ice and snow from 
getting accumulation on the 
louvers 
3. Existing designs lack literature 
information and are highly disputed 
from each other 
4. It is helpful to model wind 
directions actually for chimney 
natural circulation and 
performance modeling 
5. For the opening of the louvers, 
these situations should be taken 
into consideration: 
a. After the AC power is lost or 
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System/ID: 6. DRACS 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
station blackout, louvers 
have to open to ensure 
DRACS work 
b. The opening mechanism 
must be passive and 
electricity independent 
c. If the louver is covered by a 
considerable amount of ice, 
the DRACS performance 
might be affected 
 
Path forward: 
1. Perform scaled integral-effect tests 
2. Keep investigation and research 

















1. Keep investigation and research 
on the properties of KF-ZrF4 
2. Measurements are needed with 
uncertainties identified 
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System/ID: 6. DRACS 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Thermal inertia 






and chimney  
Peak vessel temperature: 
M 
 
DRACS salt temperature 
of the NDHX: M 
 




The time taken to respond to transients 
should be taken into consideration  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
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5. PIRT for the Event of Simultaneous Withdrawal of All 
Control Rods 
This section introduces the event of simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods, 
including the event definition, the proposed FOM and justifications of selecting these 
FOM, and the current status of modeling of the event. Based on the significance of the 
identified phenomena and current research status and knowledge base, the path 
forward to better model the event is proposed. The final PIRT results for this event are 
listed in Section 5.4.  
 
5.1. Definition of the Event 
In AHTR, the control rods (control blades) are driven by control drives that locate above 
the vessel upper flange. Each control rod is independently driven and connected to a 
leader rod. The control drive design determines the time needed of withdrawal all 
control rods, which has a significant effect on the time response of power change in the 
core. The heat transfer from the primary loop to the power conversion cycle loop is the 
major heat transfer path for this scenario. 
 
The phenomena in this event are different from those in the station blackout event. In 
this event, forced flow and active cooling are still available. Hence, the performance of 
pumps and other active cooling components is more important in this event. Since the 
primary loops are still operating, the cavity cooling is less important compared to the 
station blackout event. One important safety mechanism in the AHTR design is the 
fusible links on the control rods. If the fusible link temperature is too high, it will melt and 
the associated control rod will drop down. The fusible link is immersed in the upper 
plenum salt. One fusible link is connected to one control rod. It is designed to melt and 
release the control rod when its temperature rises above the set point. In core, there is 
temperature distribution in the reactor core; the fusible links will melt at different times, 
resulting in the control rod due to the non-uniform dropping at different times. The 
fusible link in the hot channel is expected to melt first. 
 
5.2. Proposed FOM of the Event 
For the event of simultaneous withdrawal of all the control rods, the PIRT panel 
identified and ranked phenomena based on the following FOM: 
 
1. Hot leg temperature: 
When all the control rods are accidentally withdrew at one same time, a positive 
reactivity will be introduced to move the reactor to super-criticality. The reactor 
core power will significantly increase. Meanwhile, active cooling systems are 
assumed still in operation. However, primary coolant temperature may still 
increase considerably, leading to temperature increases of the primary loop. The 
hot leg has the maximum temperature in the entire primary loop. Under this event, 
the increase in the hot leg temperature may exceed the allowed structural 
material temperature and therefore negatively affect the primary loop integrity.  
 
2. Maximum fuel kernel temperature: 
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This FOM is selected because of its significant effect on the kernel integrity of the 
TRISO fuel particles. Sudden power increases due to control rod withdrawal will 
result in temperature increases in the fuel kernels. Carbon in the TRISO particle 
captures tritium. If the fuel temperature is too high, tritium may be released into 
the primary coolant and even escape into the environment.  
  
5.3. Modeling the Event and Path Forward 
For developing simulation models for this event, system–level and CFD models will be 
needed to perform calculations of the core temperature distribution. To ensure the 
safety of the reactor operation, it is critical to investigate the coupling of the thermal-
hydraulics and neutronic analysis to take into account important multiphysics 
phenomena such as the thermal feedback effects to reactor physics analysis. Coupling 
the thermal-hydraulics and neutronic analysis is one of the key requirements to model 
this scenario. CFD core models should be able to investigate the effect of flow mixing in 
the upper plenum. Furthermore, it is essential to simulate the hot channel and 
determine the peak coolant temperature since the outlet of the hot channel is potentially 
the location of the highest salt temperature in the core that can be treated as a 
reference for the safety limit. If the temperature exceeds the melting point of fusible links, 
the associated control rods will drop. The reactor core power profile with control rods 
drop in should also be included in the model for simulating this event.  
 
For simulating the heat removal capabilities in this event, the primary coolant flow 
distribution in the various coolant channels is important. The primary coolant 
temperature change will affect the its viscosity and other thermo-physical properties, 
which will also affect the heat transfer in the primary coolant FLiBe. In this event, since 
the power conversion cycle is the ultimate heat sink, it becomes imperative to 
accurately model the heat transfer from the fuel to the primary salt/coolant to the 
intermediate loop coolant and then to the power conversion cycle working fluid. A 
simplified model to make the calculations more efficient should be envisioned first. For 
example, modeling of the power cycle loop can be simplified first, since the details of 
the power cycle are not necessarily essential for this event. 
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5.4. PIRT for Simultaneous Withdrawal of All Control Rods 
Table 23. Simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods PIRT chart -Core/Fuel 
 
System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Specific heat 
capacity of the 
carbonaceous 
material 










1. After the reactor scrams, a portion 
of the captured tritium in the 
carbonaceous materials will 
release to the salt with 
temperature increase. Tritium 
release rate depends on: 
a. Initial amount of the 
captured tritium in the 
carbonaceous materials 
b. Temperature difference 
before and after the reactor 
scram 
2. Tritium retention in the 
carbonaceous materials mainly 
depends on the temperature: 
a. Higher temperature results 
in lower tritium retention 
b. Since the temperature of 
the reflector is lower than 
that of the fuel, more tritium 
might be retained in the 
reflector instead of the fuel 
carbonaceous materials 
3. Tritium retention capability among 
different types of carbonaceous 
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System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
materials differs greatly 
4. Specific heat capacity of 
carbonaceous materials of 
different grades is well known  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined   
importance and knowledge level, this 

















Part of the TRISO particle is made of 
carbonaceous materials 
 
Path forward:  
Consult material scientists 
Specific heat 
capacity of the 
fuel stripe 





Hot leg temperature: H K 
Comments: 
The fuel stripe here is included as a part 
of carbonaceous materials  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined   
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Thermal 
conductivity of 
the fuel stripe 





Hot leg temperature: H P 
Comments: 
Analysis to this phenomenon is similar to 
that for the thermal conductivity of the 
carbonaceous materials 
 
Path forward:  
Consult material scientists 
Specific heat 
capacity of the 
fuel kernel 





Hot leg temperature: H K 
Comments: 
To study its effect on the vessel 
temperature, the mass and specific heat 
capacity of the fuel kernel need to be 
considered. Overall heat capacity is 
defined as 𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined   
importance and knowledge level, this 




the fuel kernel 





Hot leg temperature: H K 
Comments: 
The mass of the fuel kernel is small 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined   
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Energy 
generation rate 
















Hot leg temperature: H K 
Comments: 
Reactivity should be accurately predicted 
to obtain the power distribution in the core  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined   
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 







to irradiation Hot leg temperature: L U 
Comments:  
The change of the geometry will affect 
heat transfer of the coolant as well as the 
coolant flow distribution 
 
Path forward:  
Confer with material scientist; an issue 
less relative to thermal hydraulics  
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System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 




























Reactivity should be accurately predicted 
to obtain the power distribution in the core 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 










None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
 
 57                                                           Thermal-hydraulics PIRT Report 
System/ID: 1. Core (a) Fuel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 







Hot leg temperature: L P 
Comments: 
No significant effect since the primary 




None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
Fuel temperature 




per degree of 
the change in 
the 
temperature 
of the nuclear 
fuel 





None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 










None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
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Table 24. Simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods PIRT chart -Core/Primary coolant flow 
 
System/ID: 1. Core (b) Primary Coolant Flow 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
Specific heat 
capacity of FLiBe 
As a function 
of the 
temperature 





None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 





As a function 
of the 
temperature 
Hot leg temperature: H P 
Comments: 
1. Needs further investigation 




Review uncertainties in measurements; 
understand sensitivities to those 
uncertainties; if unacceptable, perform 
additional measurements 
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System/ID: 1. Core (b) Primary Coolant Flow 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 




As a function 
of the 
temperature 
Hot leg temperature: H P 
Comments: 
1. Viscosity affects flow and heat 
transfer in the core 
2. Needs further investigation 
3. Review ongoing research at 
various institutes 
 
Path forward:  
Review current uncertainties in 
measurements; understand sensitivities 
to those uncertainties; if unacceptable, 














Path forward:  
Separate-effect tests for correlation 














Hot leg temperature: L - 
Comments: 
1. Radiative heat transfer is much 
lower than convective heat transfer 
2. FLiBe is nearly transparent  
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 1. Core (b) Primary Coolant Flow 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 





ridges on the 
fuel plate 
Hot leg temperature: M P 
Comments: 
1. Similar to the surface condition 
2. Affects local flow condition 
(laminar or turbulent) 
3. Needs experiments  
 
Path forward: 






and exit loss 
coefficients 
as a function 




Hot leg temperature: L 
 




Small change in the design could 
potentially lead to large difference  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 






Due to the 
existence of 
components 
in the vessel 
 






Modeling temperature distribution can 
help check core flow asymmetry 
 
Path forward:  
Large-scale CFD model of the core with 
downcomer and scaled integral-effect 
tests 
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System/ID: 1. Core (b) Primary Coolant Flow 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 













Lower flow rate compared to that in the 
core flow channels 
 
Path forward:  
1. Design needs to be solidified  








from fuel as 
a function of 
the axial and 
radial 
position in 











Gamma spectrum is one of the direct 
energy deposition sources 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
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Table 25. Simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods PIRT chart - Vessel 
 
System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 










Hot leg temperature: H U 
Comments: 
1. Needs modeling for: 
a. Mixing and cross flow in this 
region; 
b. Heat transfer to upper plenum 
structural materials 
2. Needs system analysis on thermal 
stratification 
 
Path forward:  
1. Carryout CFD calculations of 
lower plenum, upper plenum, 
and downcomer  
2. Perform scaled experimental 








flow rate   
Hot leg temperature: M P 
Comments: 
Determines bypass flow rate  
 
Path forward: 
Continue investigation and research of 
the fluidic diodicity 
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System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 













None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
Specific heat 














None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 

















None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
 












None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
Heat transfer to 






Hot leg temperature: H U 
Comment:  
The knowledge level is unknown due to 
lack of design specificity 
 
Path forward:  
1. Testing of the specific design; 
Development of models for 
design, such as 3D heat 
conduction model 
2. Consider SFR design 
strategies and use of the Curie 
point design 
3. Control rod reliability testing 
 
Heat transfer 







Hot leg temperature: L K 
Comments: 
Simple geometry and well known  
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 2(a). Vessel 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
 
Friction factor on 











None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 








Hot leg temperature: L U 
Comments: 
Mixing in lower plenum is forced flow 
  
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
Heat transfer to 
the cover gas 







Hot leg temperature: L 
 P 
Comments: 
The top flange has a large surface area 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
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Table 26. Simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods PIRT chart - Cavity 
 
System/ID: 2(b). Cavity 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
 
Thermal 














None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 



























Path forward:  
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 2(b). Cavity 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 








and radiation Hot leg temperature: L - 
Comments: 
Reasons for the existence of argon gap: 
a. To accommodate thermal 
expansion of the insulation, 
which is inside the guard vessel  
b. To allow robots with a mirror to 
get into the gap for vessel 
inspection. This is also the 
design base for the thickness of 
the argon gap 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 

















None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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Table 27. Simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods PIRT chart – Primary loop 
 
System/ID: 3. Primary Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
















Hot leg temperature: H P 
Comments:  
Forced flow in this event. Modeling pump 
is a necessity 
 
Path forward:  
1. Design and testing of pump; 
Set pump requirements and 
share with pump vendors 














None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 3. Primary Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 









Hot leg temperature: L - 
Comments: 
During transients, form loss does not 
change significantly as compared to 
reactor normal operation, but the 
pressure drop is important to determine 
the salt flow rate 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
 














None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 3. Primary Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 






drop on the 
primary side  
Hot leg temperature: H U 
Comment:  
1. Design is not known yet 
2. Tritium management is important 
to this problem, not only heat 
removal but Tritium generation rate 
in the entire reactor lifetime is low. 
For P-IHX design, very small 
amount of Yttrium getter is 
needed. If the tritium removal 
facility works well, single wall P-
IHX can be adopted. In addition, 
the solubility of the tritium in the 
salt is low 
 
Path forward:  
1. Design and testing of P-IHX; 
Analysis that informs P-IHX 
design inputs/parameters;  


















None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 3. Primary Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 







drop in the 
primary loop 
Hot leg temperature: L - 
Comments: 
Importance level is low unless the salt 
level is below the pump 
 
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
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Table 28. Simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods PIRT chart – Intermediate loop 
 
System/ID: 4. Intermediate Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 















Path forward:  
1. Design and testing of the 
pump; Set pump requirements 
and share with pump vendors 
2. Analysis that informs pump 
design inputs/parameters; 














None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
 






fittings, etc.  






None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 4. Intermediate Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
 











None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 

















1. Design and testing of I-PHX; 
Analysis that informs I-PHX 
design inputs/parameters; 
2. Simple models are currently 
available 
 













None. Based on the combined 
importance and knowledge level, this 
phenomenon does not require further 
exploration 
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System/ID: 4. Intermediate Loop 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 






drop in the 
intermediate 
loop 





1. Design and testing of P-IHX; 
Analysis that informs P-IHX 
design inputs/parameters; 
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Table 29. Simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods PIRT chart – Power cycle 
 
System/ID: 5. Power Cycle 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 







drop on the 
power cycle 
side 
Hot leg temperature: H U 
Comments: 
1. Major heat sink in this event 
2. Simplified model of the power 
cycle loop simulation can be 
performed at first stage for 
event of the control rods 
withdrawal 
 
Path forward:  
1. Design and testing of I-PHX; 
Analysis that informs I-PHX 
design inputs/parameters; 
2. Simple models are currently 








Path forward:  
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Table 30. Simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods PIRT chart – DRACS 
 
System/ID: 6. DRACS 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 










None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 







drop on both 
sides 
Hot leg temperature: L P 
Comments: 
Needs to pay attention to DHX peak 












drop on both 
sides 





None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
does not require further exploration 
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System/ID: 6. DRACS 
Phenomenon Definition Figures of Merit (FOM) and Importance Level 
Knowledge 
Level Comments and Path Forward 
 











None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 










Hot leg temperature: L P 
Comments: 
1. Friction and loss coefficients 
(e.g. louver) 
2. Thermal stratification of the air  
Path forward: 
None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
















None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
does not require further exploration 
Thermal inertia 







and chimney  






None. Based on the combined importance 
and knowledge level, this phenomenon 
does not require further exploration 
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6. Summary of Thermal Hydraulics PIRT Panel 
An FHR thermal hydraulics PIRT panel was assembled and met at OSU on May 24-26, 
2016, which was organized by OSU and ORNL. The thermal hydraulics PIRT panel 
consisted of fifteen experts and some student observers; eleven out of the fifteen 
panelists were voting members. This report documented the thermal hydraulics PIRT 
exercise process, including FOM and phenomena identification, importance ranking, 
and knowledge level ranking. Four scenarios, including station blackout, simultaneous 
withdrawal of all control rods, reactor core flow blockage, and LOCAs, were initially 
proposed together with a number of other events. FOM were identified for each of these 
scenarios. Due to the time constraint and potential severity of the accidents, two 
identified scenarios, station blackout and simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods, 
were selected for detailed discussion.  
 
Peak vessel temperature, coolant temperature of the NDHX, peak temperature of the 
DHX, and average temperature increase of the carbonaceous materials in the core 
were defined as FOM for the event of station blackout. Hot leg temperature and 
maximum kernel temperature were defined as FOM for the event of simultaneous 
withdrawal of all control rods. In the thermal hydraulics PIRT, phenomena identification, 
importance ranking, and knowledge level ranking were performed. Furthermore, 
phenomena that need further consideration and corresponding path forward for 
modeling AHTR recommended by the panelists are included. It is suggested that large-
scale CFD simulation and system-level analyses be performed for the identified 
phenomena that need further research to improve the current AHTR design, provide 
information for undefined parameters of the AHTR, as well as increase the knowledge 
level of these phenomena.   
 
For the event of station blackout, phenomena that are ranked as of high importance 
level and low knowledge level that need further investigation, are listed as follows: 
 
• Geometry of the fuel plates, i.e., those deviation from their original geometry 
• Thermal conductivity of FLiBe 
• Viscosity of FLiBe 
• Wall friction in the core 
• Core flow asymmetry 
• Upper plenum mixing 
• Fluidic diodicity 
• Lower plenum mixing 
• DHX performance 
• NDHX performance 
• DRACS piping heat loss 
• Chimney natural circulation and performance 
• KF-ZrF4 thermo-physical properties 
 
For the event of simultaneous withdrawal of all control rods, phenomena that are ranked 
as of high importance level and low knowledge level, and therefore need further 
investigation are listed as follows: 
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• Thermal conductivity of the carbonaceous materials 
• Thermal conductivity of fuel stripe 
• Thermal conductivity of FLiBe 
• Viscosity of FLiBe 
• Core heat transfer coefficient 
• Primary coolant flow bypass faction 
• Upper plenum mixing 
• Heat transfer to fusible links for the control rods 
• Primary pump performance 
• P-IHX performance 
• Intermediate pump performance 
• I-PHX performance 
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